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TRUSTS
COLEMAN KARESH*
Sale by Trustee to Self
The rule that a sale by a trustee of trust property to him-
self is voidable by the beneficiary as his absolute option, re-
gardless of the fairness of the purchase price and the good
faith of the trustee, was tempered somewhat by the Supreme
Court, in the case of Honeywell v. Dominick.' The wife and
brother of the testator were named executors and trustees
of residuary property with general power of sale and rein-
vestment. Income was payable to the wife for life, and upon
her death the property was to go to testator's son if he was
then thirty years of age (which he was at time of suit) ; if
he should predecease the widow, to his issue, and if none sur-
viving, to the brother and sisters of testator, and to the issue
of such as may have died. The will also provided that the
widow and son should be allowed to occupy the real estate
without charge, the upkeep being imposed upon the residuary
estate. The item of property in this suit was a plantation
which had become burdensome to maintain. Without seeking
prior court approval the wife individually purchased from
herself as executrix and trustee and her co-executor-trustee
the plantation at a price representing the actual value of the
property. As additional consideration she surrendered her
life interest in the property. The adult beneficiaries consented
to the transaction. The widow thereafter spent considerable
money in repairing and improving the property and later
sold it to the plaintiffs. A confirmatory deed was also made
to the plaintiffs by the widow as executrix and trustee and
by her co-executor-trustee. Subsequently the plaintiffs con-
tracted to sell the property to another, and the vendee refused
to comply with the contract because of the possible voidable
character of the plaintiffs' title-voidable allegedly because of
the sale by the executrix-trustee to herself. This action fol-
lowed, for adjudication of rights under the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Act, and for specific performance. Contingent
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1. 223 S.C. 365, 76 S.E. 2d 59 (1953).
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remaindermen-alive and unborn-were made parties along
with the executors and trustees and the vendor.
The lower court decree confirmed the original transaction,
and the Supreme Court affirmed. While acceding to the rule
of voidability of a purchase made by a trustee individually
of the trust property, the Court was of the opinion that the
nature and circumstances of the purchase were so unusual
and extraordinary that avoidance could not take place. The
position of the Court is placed on two grounds: (1) that a
trustee may, in suitable circumstances, be permitted by the
court to become a purchaser, and that the court may confirm
"what it would have authorized upon proper application at the
time;" (2) that "The rule against the purchase of trust prop-
erty will not apply, according to the holding of many cases,
where, under the particular circumstances of the case, the
reason for the rule does not exist, as, for example, where there
is no possibility of advantage to the trustee or prejudice to
the trust estate from the transaction in question. 54 Am. Jur.
362, Trusts, Sec. 456." There are inherent dangers in these
propositions which, carried to their logical conclusions, could
result in destroying the beneficiary's power to avoid and with
it the policy of the rule, but such considerations would re-
quire treatment beyond the limits of this survey. The Court
is careful to point out, however, that the rule is not "whittled
away," and that only circumstances of an extraordinary char-
acter may, as here, permit its application. An examination
of the facts in the case discloses a combination of unique cir-
cumstances that, if they were not allowed to operate outside
the rule, would result in shocking injustice. With the rule
judicially preserved and justice done, only satisfaction can
be expressed with the result of the case.
Beneficiary as Trustee
The familiar rule that one cannot be trustee for himself is
used by the Supreme Court, in Industrial Equipment Co. v.
Montague,2 to dispose of a case involving the alleged misuse
of corporate funds by an officer who had distributed the funds
to all the stockholders of the corporation, including himself.
The corporate problems of this case are discussed under Cor-
porations. From the trust point of view, the significant fea-
ture of the case lies in this language:
2. 224 S.C. 510, 80 S.E. 2d 114 (1954).
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Undoubtedly, corporate directors are at least quasi-
trustees in their dealings with the property of the cor-
poration and the relation is fiduciary in its nature ...
But here the directors were also all the stockholders in
this private, business corporation, whence they may be
said, for the purpose of this decision, to have been the
corporation itself. In that light, the trust relation dis-
appears because one cannot be a trustee of property for
himself.
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